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Abstract: Certain key ideas have served to stimulate thought about the nature of 
sociological inquiry by presenting frameworks which are adjustable to the varying 
demands of different sorts of data. They provide, as it were, heuristics which 
enable a systematic debate about the optimal simplifications that are enjoined by 
varying types of data, notably what are sometimes labelled as quantitative and 
qualitative. In so doing they facilitate a variety of analyses, generate hypotheses 
and eventually lead to discoveries that transcend inherited boundaries. Our claim 
is that the Coleman diagram, though largely interpreted within a quantitative 
tradition, is one such framework for formalizing qualitative methods and for 
understanding the interplay between different types of data in the social sciences.  
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Narratives 
Social scientists frequently seek to analyse groups, communities, organisations and other collective 
entities, even total societies, as “objects” or units of inquiry. In so doing they document these 
entities in terms of their properties (e.g. group cohesion), their relationships to each other (e.g. inter 
group competition) and the causal mechanisms, which bring about changes in their properties and 
relationships. Let us call this the macro level of causal analysis. For many decades issues have been 
debated which draw connections between this sort of analysis and a focus upon the individual units 
within the collective entities, their properties (e.g. gender), their relationships to each other (e.g. 
interpersonal trust) and the causal mechanisms which drive them. Let us call this the micro level of 
analysis. In the general context of the relationship between the micro and macro the so-called 
Coleman Diagram (or boat, see Figure 1) has gained a notable reputation where the arrows are 
often, though not invariably, interpreted as causal connections of one sort or another, each of which 
may imply a connecting social mechanism (Hedstrom, 2005) either observed or theoretically 
postulated1. The “boat shape” is used to imply passage of time from left to right. Furthermore, 
repeated diagrams whereby the exogenous macro cause is the outcome/effect of a previous cycle 
may be conceived2.  
Figure 1: Coleman's diagram (about here) 
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 Coleman was insistent that the explanatory objective of the sociologist is always to explain the 
macro (system) outcome or “social organisation” at the top right hand corner of his diagram, and 
not the individual level (i.e. the bottom right hand corner). Coleman is, thus, clear that the process of 
discovery must be directed at the macro level. Furthermore, “the minimal basis for a social system is 
two (micro) actors each having control over resources of interest to the other” (Coleman, 1990; 
p29). This then implies that the micro level is usually concerned with interdependent (i.e. 
interactive) micro actions and, though Coleman introduces a rather complex picture of 
interdependencies, it is perhaps helpful initially to distinguish between strategic and parametric 
interdependence. The former implying that the actor faces others as a reactive environment and the 
latter as a fixed environment. Strategic interactions do, of course invite game theory as the most 
powerful theoretical framework (e.g. Diekman, 1985). Either way, Coleman was a very early 
advocate of, “structural research which will represent a truly sociological methodology”. In this 
sense he was somewhat ahead of his time and it is only with the subsequent flowering of social 
network theory that the “sociological methodology”, as he conceived it, has begun to bear fruit 3. 
 Clearly Coleman’s diagram invites rather complicated research designs, which is the issue we wish 
to address in this short paper. How can it direct and fashion research design? As he observes “... it is 
one thing to trace the development of social organisation in a particular instance, as a historian 
might do, and quite another to develop generalisations about such processes”. We shall argue that 
as a consequence of the inherent complexity in research designs sociologists may often have to rely 
upon what we term ethnographic (i.e. small 𝑁) causality rather than statistical models of causality 
based upon frequencies (large 𝑁) and covariance (Abell, 2009).  
The Coleman diagram generates debates about reduction, methodological individualism, top down 
and bottom up causality, in contrast to emergence and social wholes and collective causality. 
Reduction usually implies that any concept deployed at the macro level can be “derived from” or 
“reduced to” concepts at the micro level, implying that the macro is defined in terms of the micro. 
This applies equally to the cause, the effect and to the connecting causal mechanism at the macro 
level. Emergence, on the other hand, denies this to be the case, implying then that macro concepts 
are, in some sense, sui generis. These issues may be extended to more than two levels when it is 
then, for example, appropriate to speak of the micro, the meso and the macro levels.  
Particularly problematic are issues of causality. Can causal relations and mechanisms at the macro 
level (arrow 4) always be reduced to micro causality (i.e. the conjunction of arrows 1, 2 and 3)? Or, 
what amounts to the same thing, can macro causal mechanisms be faithfully constructed from micro 
causal connections? Coleman (1990, p5) argues that “no assumption is made that explanation of 
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systemic (“i.e. macro”) behaviour consists of nothing more than individual action and orientation 
taken in aggregate. The interaction among individuals is seen to result in emergent phenomena at 
the system level, that is phenomena that is neither intended nor predicted....”. Coleman, thus, tends 
to construe emergent macro outcomes as the unintended outcomes of micro actions, presumably 
also not predicted by the actors involved4. He was also concerned to place sociological inquiry within 
a framework of policy recommendation. Any such recommendation implies prediction which in turn 
implies causal explanation which usually then implies the detection of generalisations based upon 
comparative studies. It is therefore useful to see how his diagram relates to such complex ambitions 
by directing research appropriately.  
 At the micro level it is perhaps rather straight forward to interpret the causal connection as taking 
the form: micro cause(s) →individual actions/interactions→ micro outcome(s). That is to say, it is 
individual actions (or forbearances) and interactions which drive things along, connecting causes to 
outcomes. Agency provides “the mechanism through which the focal independent variable is able to 
influence the dependent variable of interest” (Baron and Kenny, 1986). There has been much recent 
analysis of causality in terms of what are called causal powers. It is then tempting to adopt an 
entirely parallel picture at the macro level where group actions/interaction (whatever this might 
mean) becomes the focus of attention. Thus, we would have: macro cause(s) brings about group 
actions/interactions which brings about macro outcome(s). This simple parallel, however, hides a 
multitude of possible problems. Indeed, If full reduction is at all feasible then the top arrow (4) as an 
independent causal relation falls away merely standing as a shorthand for the causal route through 
the micro level and back up to the macro. If so, how do the vertical (causal?) connections fit into this 
framework? Indeed, whilst the macro-micro link is pretty un-controversially interpreted as causal, 
the micro to macro link, as Coleman observed, is not necessarily so easily dispatched, sometimes it 
involves mere aggregation of micro outcomes (when full attention must be paid to issues of 
ecological correlation, (King, et al., 2004)), other times it is suggested as causal, implying a 
contingently independent way of characterising the macro effect. The Coleman diagram 
systematically directs researchers to engage with these issues at the very outset of their research. It 
provides a map of problems that must be addressed from the start. Inspection of the papers in many 
of the journals suggests that Coleman’s implicit injunctions are not always taken to heart.  
 Coleman urged that micro and macro units of analysis are characteristically interdependent and it is 
widely acknowledged that drawing samples of units as if they are independent, as much survey 
research does, is likely to lead to misleading results. This implies that we have to take account of 
structures (networks) of units, at all levels in the context of the causal inferences in his diagram. This, 
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as we shall see, introduces demanding requirements in order to enable large 𝑁 statistical treatment 
as reliable.  
 Given the demanding requirements and assumptions of large 𝑁 multilevel studies, which 
furthermore characteristically involve networks at both levels, it is unlikely that many of the 
multilevel problems, conforming with the Coleman diagram, which social scientists may wish to 
address can easily be pursued in a statistical manner. A multilevel analysis when only a few or even a 
single macro unit is available (either pragmatically or in fact) needs to be fashioned. Since the 
Coleman diagram is often structured around causal relations, this amounts to finding a way of 
investigating causality in the absence of inter-unit comparison and generalisation (Abell, 2009;Abell 
and Engel 2018); that is to say, an ethnographic concept of causality. The diagram carries the virtue 
that it enjoins the researcher to address issues of large versus small 𝑁 from a principled standpoint 
not merely as a personal disposition.  
The paper develops as follows; first, the general framework of multilevel networks is introduced; 
second, Bayesian Narratives will be briefly introduced: third, ethnographic causality is explored as a 
possible solution to intractable complexities of statistical based causality.  
A General Framework, Multilevel Networks 
 The statistical hierarchical linear model, where units of analysis at both the micro and macro levels 
(e. g. individuals and groups) can be independently drawn from (often hypothetical) populations, is 
now well developed (Snijders and Bosker,2012),5 enabling a coherent research interpretation of the 
Coleman diagram. The model, however, does not capture Coleman’s insistence that units at both 
levels cannot be drawn independently since their properties depend upon the properties of their 
neighbours as they are each embedded in their respective networks.  
 A useful abstract framework, which acknowledges non -independence, places the analysis of the 
relationship between the micro and macro in terms of three types of multiplex networks (Bliemel, 
McCarthy and Maine, 2014) defined upon vector labelled nodes i.e. multiplex di-graphs or graphs 
defined upon vector labelled nodes; one at the macro level, one at the micro level and a bipartite 
graph assigning micro units into macro units (Snijders and Lazega, 2016). A vector labelled nodes 
multiplex network consists of a fixed set of nodes (usually finite), each of which may carry various 
measured properties, and sets of directed or undirected relationship types (edges) running between 
some pairs of nodes which, in turn, may also carry measured weightings. Networks may, of course, 
be depicted as matrices of one sort or another. The bipartite graph may allow micro-units to be in 
more than one macro-unit (i.e. multiple group membership). If so then micro-units with a place in 
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more than one group will contribute to inter-macro unit relations. In addition, relations running 
between micro level units which are in turn affiliated with distinct macro-units, contribute to inter-
macro unit relations (see Figure 2). Finally, macro-units may be related by “emergent” macro level 
relations (e.g. group relations not derivable from inter-individual relations). 
  
Figure 2: micro-network (left) and the corresponding macro network (right) (about here) 
 An example may help to clarify issues. The micro level may comprise a selected group of individuals 
(i.e. micro nodes), each of whom carries the properties of both weighted group identity and gender 
(vector labelled nodes of length 2). Some or all pairs of individuals may, to a degree, interact with 
each other (say an ordinal symmetric relation) and trust each other (say a directed binary relation). 
The members may exclusively belong to the selected group or to more than one group with an 
associated strength of identity. At the macro level the nodes are groups, each carrying the property 
of group cohesion and group size (again vector of length 2) whilst some or all pairs of groups are in 
inter-group competitive and inter-group domination relationships.  
Transferring this complexity to the Coleman diagram, the research objective is to explain either the 
incidence of or change in group cohesion (the top right hand corner of the Coleman diagram) where 
cohesion is a property of the group embedded in a macro network (Figure 3). The other three points 
in the Coleman diagram now also become multiplex, vector labelled node networks. Thus the 
diagram now has vector labelled node networks at each corner. This very general picture then 
invites queries as to how aspects of networks causally create modified networks at both the micro 
and macro levels. This complex picture inevitably arises if we embrace Coleman’s insistence that 
sociology is a structural science. Furthermore, Coleman suggests that if we fail to follow this then 
sociological knowledge will not become cumulative. We are far from certain that this is correct but it 
does offer food for thought and his diagram so formulated promotes a general heuristic in 
formulating sociological research. 
Figure 3: Networks and the Coleman diagram (about here) 
Within this framework and the example, potential causal relationships at both levels can run 
between: 
(1) Distinct properties of the nodes, including their structural location in their 
respective networks e.g. in-degree, centrality etc.in a network (i.e. in network 
terms, monadic analysis). For example, at the macro-level, the causal inference 
could be between group size and group cohesion measured across groups. Whilst 
at the micro level it could be between individual identity with the group and 
gender across the individuals in the selected (sampled) group. 
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(2) Distinct relation types between pairs of nodes, (i.e. in network terms, dyadic 
analysis). For example, at the macro level the inference could be between inter-
group dominance and inter-group competition across groups in the macro 
networks. At the micro level it could be the impact of inter-personal interaction 
upon inter-personal trust.  
(3) Distinct properties of the nodes and the relationship between pairs of nodes, 
(mixed monadic dyadic analysis). For example, at the macro level the inference 
could be between a group’s cohesion and inter-group competition and at the 
micro level the impact of gender upon inter-personal trust. 
 Both levels allow for local measures characterising each node’s structural location in terms of their 
relationships to other nodes carrying properties (e.g. trust in-degree/out degree weighted by 
identity of structural neighbours) and global measures characterising the whole network (e.g. 
network trust density perhaps weighted by identity). Given this picture it is important to observe 
that macro units (like groups) can be said to possess both global-micro properties derived from their 
individual level networks and macro-local measure in virtue of the position of the group in the macro 
network.  
It is also important to be clear about what constitutes the population of macro level units. They 
could be networks of relations on group nodes, then the population from which the networks are 
drawn would all be networks of this sort. But in practice given the constraints of research and the 
difficulties in defining such populations then the focus will likely be upon some groups in a particular 
group level network. This might be designated as a meso level where the units of analysis will be 
specific groups with external relations to other, non-observed, groups in the network. By taking the 
cohesion of groups as the macro outcome to be explained in the previous example, the groups (with 
of course have an internal network structure on individual nodes) will be treated as nodes with a 
node specific pattern of external relation types to other groups.  
The statistical (large 𝑁) approach, adopting this framework often depends upon two stage sampling 
– namely a sample of macro units and of micro units each of which is nested in one or more of the 
macro units (groups). These samples, in turn, depend upon a specification of appropriate 
populations from which they are drawn. Furthermore, since the units at both levels are located in 
networks they cannot be independently sampled necessitating specialised statistical inference 
procedures (Snijders and Lazega, 2016) appropriate to networks. The statistical procedures for 
analysing this sort of complexity are in their infancy but developing rapidly and should be fully 
embraced where empirically feasible6. However, the data requirements and assumptions are so 
demanding that it is difficult to see how many of the macro outcomes we might be interested to 
explain causally can be approached in a fully-fledged statistical manner. Observing samples of 
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connected macro and micro units, each drawn from defined populations, is clearly daunting. Rather 
a small number or even a single case of the macro unit is a more likely focus. This implies that we 
will study a few macro units and perhaps seek to achieve a meta-analysis across other similar but 
not identical studies whilst retaining Coleman’s ambition to explain macro outcomes. A limited sort 
of statistical analysis can be achieved with only a handful of cases/units using, for instance, Fisher’s 
(1958) method, but any causal inference remains hazardous. Coleman (1990) himself acknowledges 
these issues both in his analysis of the classical Weberian thesis about Calvinism and Capitalism and 
in the early “qualitative” chapters of his monumental book. However, the nature of causal inference 
in these “qualitative” endeavours remains rather obscure. How can we address the complexity of 
multilevel network analyses where units are not independently sampled and where either data only 
upon a limited number of macro units is available or comparators are scarce? In either eventuality 
this rules out systematic comparison and statistical generalisation each of which are the standard 
ingredients of any causal inference.  
 Bayesian Narratives and Small 𝑵 Multi-level Analysis. 
To express the problem succinctly, we need to furnish a method of causal inference, charting the 
role which social actions and interactions play, that depends neither upon systematic comparison 
nor statistical generalisation across cases. Bayesian Narratives claim to provide such a method 
(Abell, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, Abell and Engel 2018). A narrative comprises a time ordered di-graph 
where a chronology of nodes represents causal conditions, intervening actions and outcomes and 
the edges causality (i.e. consistent with causes→ actions /interactions→effects. The Coleman 
diagram when matched with narratives can then be depicted with narratives lying on causal links 2 
and 4 providing the connective mechanisms, the former describing the interactions between groups 
and the latter between individuals within groups (Figure 4). Thus, two types of narrative provide, as 
it were, the connecting causal mechanisms, respectively at the macro and micro levels. The arrows 1 
and 3 are handled differently –see below.  
Figure 4: Inserting narratives into the Coleman diagram (about here) 
The question still remains as to how the causal relations (edges) are to be studied in the absence of 
frequent comparative cases? Ethnographic causality provides one possible route which introduces 
the idea of a Bayesian narrative. Before however exploring the conception of ethnographic causality 





Macro- Causality?  
Do macro causal effects (arrow 4) exist, or can they always, at least in principle if not necessarily in 
practice, be reduced to the conjunction of arrows 1, 2 and 3 in Coleman’s diagram? This is of course 
a thorny issue in the history of sociology at least since Durkheim’s time. If we stand by the 
assumption that causal links must involve intervening mechanisms, featuring actions and 
interactions (i.e. driving mechanisms), then to assert the existence of independent macro causes 
seems to necessitate a concept of irreducible collective action7. This would imply that the narrative 
connecting the exogenous macro- structural distribution to its modification could only be 
constructed in terms of collective actors embedded in the macro networks. Reductionists would, 
however, say that when collective actions are correctly conceived they ultimately imply actions by 
individuals in the collective (group) taken in recognition of and on behalf of the group. Such 
statements seem to imply that the individual actions are, at least partially caused by the collective 
level (arrow 1). Although we favour in principle reduction we do not want to take a definitive 
position on this issue here.  
In the context of the Coleman diagram it is worth noting that the causal connection between the 
exogenous macro cause through arrows 1,2 and 3 to the macro effect/outcome comprises a 
complex intervening mechanism running between the macro variables which are also, in addition, 
directly connected by arrow 4.8 The now standard way of thinking about the impact of direct causes, 
in observational studies, is due to Pearl (2009) and his concept of causality derivative of a-cyclic 
directed graphs (DAGS). By fixing the value of the intervening variable (in Pearl’s analysis, by deleting 
all the causal arrows incident into the intervening variable) can surrender an estimate if the direct 
effect, here the macro causal effect, if it exists. Thus, the emergent standpoint requires that there is 
no such reduction available that eradicates the direct macro causal connection. This procedure, as 
we shall see, has implications for the ethnographic causality.  
Ethnographic (Small-𝑵) Causality 
Causal connections between events (in the current context between multiplex, vector labelled node 
networks) are to be derived from ethnographic investigation of those involved in the generation of 
the causal link which produces the transformation (arrow 2 in Figure 1). It is essential to 
acknowledge that ethnographic studies commence with analyses of actions and interactions, not the 
events they connect. The latter then empirically arise from the former9. This may be envisaged as 
examining the actual arrows in the Coleman diagram. 
 Careful in depth interviewing can, with due cautions, elicit statements about actions and 
interactions of the general form (Abell and Engel, 2018): 
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 “I did 𝑋𝑜 because of 𝑋𝑐 to realise 𝑌” (a subjective causal statement); 
“I would not have done (forborne to do) 𝑋𝑜 if  𝑋𝑐 had not been the case” (a 
subjective counterfactual statement); 
Where  𝑋𝑐 , 𝑋𝑜 and 𝑌  are characteristically conjunctions of events, states or other actions expressed 
in natural language of those observed 10. The beauty of such statements is that, if they can be 
regarded as reasonably credible, we are put in possession of evidence for both the causal connection 
and counterfactual for the same unit of analysis (Individual). This of course contrasts with statistical 
analysis where both cannot be observed for the same unit and various comparative procedures have 
to be resorted to making a strong assumption of across unit homogeneity. It should be emphasised, 
further, that the claim for a causal link does not derive from the conditional probability connecting 
the causal events as, for instance in Bayesian nets. Although a causal connection with a high 
posterior probability of existing based upon credible statements (i.e. a case study) may provide 
evidence for computing such probabilities.  
 Furthermore, counter- potential statements of the general form; 
“I could have forborne to do 𝑋𝑜 in 𝑋𝑐”, and 
“I could have done 𝑋𝑜 in the absence of 𝑋𝑐”  
can also in principle be elicited, which effectively maintain the voluntary nature of causality 
generated by human agency. Some ethnographers are reluctant to evoke any concept of social 
causality precisely on the grounds that they believe intentional actions cannot be causally 
determined and this reservation also often extends to a rejection of statistical causality based upon 
generalisation (covariance) and inter-unit comparison. Subjective counter - potentials, if deemed 
credible, can alleviate these reservations.  
First, person subjective causal, counterfactual and counter-potential statements can also be 
complemented by third person renditions- she did 𝑋𝑜 etc. In addition, first and third person plural 
(we, they) statements may apparently allow for the idea of collective causality (arrow 4 in the 
Coleman diagram). However, the reservations expressed above about collective action should be 
kept in mind.  
All depends, of course upon the credibility of such statements which in turn depends upon the 
credibility of their proponents as sources of information about their own and others 
actions/interactions as estimated by ethnographers in their social interaction with them. The 
elegance of ethnographic inquiry derives from the notion that justified, credible and mutual belief 
can arise from the social constructions arrived at in social interactions between the ethnographer 
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and subjects. Ethnographers usually commence inquiry by asking for the meaning of certain actions 
which is sometimes expressed as determining “what is going on here”. 
 In the present context the focus is, firstly, upon actors embedded in networks at the micro levels 
and how their experiences (set 𝑋𝑐) causes them to act in the way they do. Secondly, the focus 
switches to the consequences of the actions /interactions (set Y).  
It is imperative to contrast the methodology involved in ethnographic inferences to that involved in, 
what we might term, standard social network theory. The latter starts with a given set of units and 
derives a picture of their binary relations and node properties, usually making use of standard 
interview schedules. Ethnographic inference, on the other hand, painstakingly constructs the 
networks on the basis of the actors’ elicited causal and counterfactual statements (Abell and Engel, 
2018). In the case of set 𝑋𝑐, the causes of a given action 𝑋𝑜 are sought in the case of set 𝑌, the 
effects of a given action is the focus. In the case of small groups then this may involve all the group 
members but for larger groups the ethnographer (s) may have to carefully select members and 
resort to standard ethnographic concepts of convergence in order to resolve when to terminate the 
analysis.  
Characteristically, a particular actor’s set 𝑋𝑐 may, at the micro level, refer to others’ actions and their 
properties and to their own ego network position. Reference may also be to properties of the group 
and to the group’s location in the macro network. In this sense the multi-level analysis can be 
derived from the subjective causal and counterfactual statements. Set 𝑌 can be similarly be used to 
fabricate the modified micro network. The construction of causes and effects in this manner require 
the difficult to acquire, skills of what we might term a local historian. The sets 𝑋𝑐 and 𝑌, it should be 
noted, are conjunctive causes and effects. Being postulated in a particular case they cannot logically 
be alternatives. Thus, the constructed narrative is an “and graph” unlike the “or graph” models in 
statistical structural modelling. 
 Returning to the much debated causal connection at the macro-level (arrow4); firstly subjective 
statements in the plural may be used to imply collective actions but with all reservations expressed 
above. If actors specify, in the context of set 𝑋𝑐, macro properties of macro units then these will 
count as contributing to arrow 1 in Coleman’s diagram. Similarly set 𝑌 may refer to macro outcomes 
-“I/she did 𝑋𝑜 to help generate group cohesion 𝑌”. However, more likely, set 𝑌 will not refer to 
macro outcomes but to changes contributing to the modified micro structural distribution (bottom 
right hand corner). Then the macro- outcome is some summary aggregate measure of this structural 
distribution (e.g. network density weighted by individual identity). Whether this should be regarded 
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as causal is controversial. Since the mapping from states of the structural distribution to the macro 
state will be many to one the relationship between a particular micro-state and the macro state is 
only probabilistic and not, therefore, like a one to one conventional definition some regard it as 
causal.  
Conclusions 
The Coleman diagram provides an indispensable guide to the construction of genuine causal 
analyses of macro level outcomes. It has traditionally invited statistical (large 𝑁) analyses which are 
probably now best interpreted in terms of (linear) network hierarchical models which run faithful to 
Coleman’s structural perspective. Such models should always be the first choice of sociologists, but 
given the interdependencies between entities in the data, often impose such demanding 
requirements and challenging assumptions upon the investigator to render them impractical. 
Moreover, when studies require the specification of detailed causal conditions, the number of 
comparative cases dwindles to the point where statistical techniques become inappropriate. Causal 
analysis has always been exclusively associated with a generalising, comparative large 𝑁 perspective 
which has led many small 𝑁 “qualitative researcher” to dispense with the concept altogether. 
However, Bayesian Narrative Analysis (which should not be confused with Bayesian Networks) 
begins to open up a systematic way of inferring causality based upon subjective causal, 
counterfactual and counter potential evidence, where any limited generalisation across cases is 
posterior to causal explanation, not a presumption of explanation11.  
Foot-Notes  
(1) Coleman’s use of the diagram was anticipated by a number of authors, though it has become 
indelibly associated with his name (Raub and Voss, 2016). 
(2) We have labelled the diagram (unlike Coleman) in terms of causes and effects as this paper will 
concentrate upon causal relations. It should be understood that when thinking within a statistical 
framework all matters of the distribution of residuals and unobserved covariates producing spurious 
effects have been solved. Thus, the inference from co-variation to causality is as unproblematic as is 
feasible.  
(3) The assumption of independence derives from the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA) underlying causal inference in most statistical (large 𝑁) studies. This assumption requires 
that the causal outcome of a unit of analysis is independent of all other units and the method of 
treating the unit. In the context of this paper it is noteworthy that some social scientists refer to this 
assumption as “no macro effect”.  
12 
 
(4) Presumably Coleman means a non-intended/predicted collective outcome. This may be an 
aggregate of the outcome of individual actors, when the aggregate/collective concept is reducible 
even though it was not predicted/intended by the actor. The fact that it was not intended/predicted 
does not invalidate a reductive stance. The argument against reduction and for emergence has to be 
found elsewhere (see below). 
(5) The Coleman diagram was proposed in period when the role of a macro level variable varying 
across groups would likely be interpreted by a fixed effect regression equation sometimes called a 
contextual effect equation. This formulation, however, assumes that the regression on the micro 
level variables do not vary across groups. We now re-formulate the model as the hierarchical linear 
model to allow for both coefficients which vary across groups and errors at the micro and macro 
levels. Thus, with standard precautions and adopting the vocabulary of cause and effect to depict 
statistical relations the hierarchical linear model allows that a macro (group) level, (cause) (Coleman 
top left) has both a direct effect and an interactive effect with a exogenous micro cause (Coleman 
bottom left) on the micro effect (Coleman bottom right) (Sjniders and Bosker, 2004). The approach is 
extendable to many micro and macro causes. Note that this formulation of arrow 1 in the Coleman 
diagram does not run a causal link between the macro cause and the micro cause. Rather in the 
standard interpretation of the macro cause impacts the micro effect directly and, in addition, 
interacts with the micro cause. In this latter effect the macro variable impacts the mechanism (i.e. 
actions and interactions) connecting the micro cause to micro effect (arrow 2). We shall see below 
this interpretation has virtues in respect of ethnographic causality.  
(6) A number of statistical techniques for analysing networks as either independent (causal) or 
dependent (effect) variables are available. However, models for both at the same time are not fully 
developed. 
(7) The term collective action is used in a variety ways in the literature. The powerful literature on 
game theory usually studies how individual interests can generate a collective (Nash) equilibrium. 
But note there is an implicit reductionist viewpoint being expressed here. More generally, the term 
is used in propositions of the form “the group did 𝑋𝑜”. As a pragmatic contribution such statements 
are indispensable but can they in principle always be reduced to statements about individuals doing 
things in the name of the group. Note, if so, then this looks like an arrow 1 in Coleman’s diagram. 
(See below).  
(8) Since the macro outcome might be over-determined, in the sense that alternative causes are 
sufficient but not necessary for a causal connection, then some of these links may be reducible and 
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others not. Issues of non-observed confounding spurious relations at the macro level might also 
arise. Then Pearl’s concept (2009) of the backdoor will be a consideration. 
 (9) A large 𝑁 (statistical) study will characteristically find a co-variation between events and then 
either theoretically or by observation postulate the mechanism that purportedly connects them. 
 (10) Clearly alternative locutions are possible.  
 (11) Some readers may have seen a parallel between the issues raised by the Coleman diagram and 
the fraught debate about group selection in evolutionary theory. Indeed, some authors use the term 
co-evolution to describe the implied dynamics connecting the micro and macro in Coleman’s 
diagram. However, dynamic processes are not necessarily the same as evolutionary selection and 
loose parallels are dangerous. It is not at all clear from the Coleman diagram what the selective units 
would be.  
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Figure 6: micro-network (left) and the corresponding macro network (right)  
 





Figure 8: Inserting narratives into the Coleman diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
